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Sławomir Masłoń
Haze Sole Certitude: Confusion and Figure 
in Samuel Beckett's /// Seen III Said
Samuel Beckett’s III Seen III Said,1 the second of the three works which can 
be considered his second “trilogy” (the others being Company1 2 and Worstward 
Ho3 4), presents us with the scene of seeing — we encounter the instrument of 
vision: “this filthy eye of flesh” (74) as well as “the other” one (64).* It sees 
a certain “she” in a certain landscape:
The cabin. [...] At the inexistent centre of a formless place. Rather more 
circular than otherwise finally. Flat to be sure. To cross it in a straight line 
takes her from five to ten minutes. [...] Stones increasingly abound. Ever 
scanter even the rankest weed. Meagre pastures hem it round on which it 
slowly gains. (58)
The two zones [stone and pasture] form a roughly circular whole. As though 
outlined by a trembling hand. Diameter. Careful. Say one furlong. On an 
average. Beyond the unknown. (59)
There is also a (grave?) stone to which she is at times drawn, sometimes there 
are ewes in the pasture, and constantly the twelve figures, in the familiar 
Beckettian long overcoats and block hats, who watch her from afar, always 
1 First published in French as Mai vu Mai dit (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1981) and then in 
the author’s translation as III Seen III Said (London: John Calder, 1982).
1 First published in English as Company (London: John Calder, 1980).
3 First published in English as Worstward Ho (London: John Calder, 1983).
4 My quotations come from the collected edition: Samuel Beckett, Nohow On: Company, III 
Seen III Said, Worstward Ho (London: John Calder, 1989); page numbers in the text.
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from the same distance. These images keep fading, yet they always come back 
again.
The figure of a woman seems to be no more than an apparition — she 
comes and goes as she pleases:
With her right hand she holds the edge of the bowl. With her left the spoon 
dipped in the slop. So far so good. But before she can proceed she fades and 
disappears. Nothing now for the staring eye but the chair in its solitude. 
(78—79)
Although less “material” than objects (which are, nevertheless, imaginary 
ones), she is not within the controlling powers of the eye and, therefore, seems 
to be more than just a figment of imagination. If she appears balancing on the 
invisible line dividing presence from absence, then the question arises: which 
eye sees her — the eye of flesh or the other? But there is no knowing:
Already all confusion. Things and imaginings. As of always. Confusion 
amounting to nothing. Despite precautions. If only she could be pure figment. 
Unalloyed. This old so dying woman. So dead. In the madhouse of the skull 
and nowhere else. Where no more precautions to be taken. No precautions 
possible. Cooped up there with the rest. Hovel and stones. The lot. And the 
eye. How simple all then. If only all could be pure figment. Neither be nor 
been nor by any shift to be. (67)
The reason why there is no knowing if she is inside or outside the skull lies in 
the fact that the eye, in its essence, is one, although doubled — the eye of flesh 
and the eye of mind are one and the same since no matter whether they use the 
sensible or the intelligible as their “raw materials,” they always make them into 
supposedly immutable figures (“Neither be nor been nor by any shift to be”), 
because they are the only “means” by which the eye can grasp anything. In this 
way, it is the eye that produces, “fictions” or, as the narrator would say, 
“poisons” both the real and the imagined — that is why the ideas of the 
outside and the inside seem to cease to mean much any more:
Such the confusion now between real and — how say its contrary? No matter. 
That old tandem. Such now the confusion between them once so twain. And 
such the farrago from eye to mind. For it to make what sad sense it may. No 
matter now. Such equal liars both. Real and — how ill say its contrary? The 
counter-poison. (82)
This confusion between the real and fiction may be said to add to our original 
hypothesis of the female figure as the apparition, since such a confusion is one 
of the crucial points Freud clearly emphasises when he tries to analyse the 
sources of the uncanny:
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There is one more point of general application which I should like to add, 
though, strictly speaking, it has been included in what has already been said 
about animism and modes of working of the mental apparatus that have been 
surmounted; for I think it deserves special emphasis. This is that an uncanny 
effect is often and easily produced when the distinction between the 
imagination and reality is effaced, as when something that we have hitherto 
regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes 
over the full functions of the thing it symbolises, and so on.5
We could also add that one of the other things Freud mentions as the sources 
of the uncanny is repetition in diverse forms: as the recurrence of the same 
thing, as the returning of the repressed affects or as the compulsion to repeat.6 
Without delving too much into the psychological side of psychoanalysis, we 
can only notice in passing that repetition is definitely one of the basic 
structural motifs of III Seen III Said (and the whole trilogy). However, what 
interests us more here is the relationship between the uncanny scene as it is 
seen and the scopic as such.
Since, as demonstrated by Freud, a given situation is perceived as uncanny 
when the confusion between the real and the imaginary arises, the scene of the 
uncanny must be the region in which the eye loses the hold of what it actually 
sees or does not see. But such a position is not the position of knowledge, what 
is perceived is uncertain and questionable — the uncanny destabilises, defa­
miliarises perception of the phenomenal and especially the scopic. We can say, 
therefore, that what seems to be missing in the uncanny is precisely what Plato 
would call an idea, that is to say, the “forms,” that which brings the pheno­
menal under the aegis of knowledge, that which schematises and, therefore, 
establishes the real.
But, obviously, it is not the missing idea that is re-presented as the old 
woman, neither is she the missing of the idea. The appearance of the appari­
tion accomplishes a much more subtle sleight of hand. Because she is co-exis­
tent with the confusion between the Active and the non-fictive, it is impossible 
to establish whether she originates from the confusion or is the originator of it.
Presence is a double “phenomenon” — it is at once the presence of the 
object of consciousness to consciousness (reason, self, mind’s eye — whatever 
we call it), and the presence of consciousness to itself. The present object of 
consciousness is necessarily ideal, since, in order to appear in consciousness (in 
order to present itself), it has to be rid of all empirical diversity — it has to be 
identical with itself as the same. And it is precisely the very ideality of such an 
3 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in: Art and Literature, ed. Albert Dickson (London: 
Penguin Books, 1990), p. 367.
0 Freud, “The Uncanny,” pp. 258—261.
42 Sławomir Masłoń
object that makes possible its being infinitely repeated as re-presented as the 
image of the immutable same. If this is the case, then we can say that the 
sensible re-presentation is the return of the pre-expressive presentation of the 
ideal object of consciousness. But there is a logical flaw in this understanding 
of representation (although such an understanding is the history of meta­
physics) — the very possibility of the return of presentation as re-presentation 
is what makes presentation as such impossible: re-presentation would not be 
possible, if presentation did not already allow its own absence. That is to 
say, the repetition of the same of presentation would be out of the question, if 
this same were not originally other than itself.7 The above would therefore 
bring us to the conclusion that it is not the same which is the matrix for 
repetition or re-presentation, but that it is precisely repetition or the split 
origin of the same that produces the same — that, originally, the same is 
always other to itself. What is more, this primal differing from itself is 
obviously also the point where the originary deferring8 takes place, as the 
identity of the object is always deferred in the chain of representations the 
object is. (The object is always already a representation, a repetition which can 
lead only to another repetition.) Therefore, the originary repetition is also the 
site where time and space originate, but not as presence — if time meant just 
presence, if the source of time were not already split, if time did not originally 
defer itself, if it were identical with itself, time would already be still-born at its 
very source, or, in other words, there would be neither time nor space since 
there could not be any difference between the points of time or space. Thus the 
origin of consciousness is split, is always already repeated. In terms of our 
discussion, this means that, since it is always at once present and absent, it can 
never be stabilised enough to be seen (as either present or absent) and, there­
fore, it can never be made into a figure; moreover, for the very reason that the 
split is anterior to consciousness, or, rather, that it is what produces con­
sciousness, it is irrecoverable for consciousness — the subject cannot see 
(theorise, figure) its own conception.
We can say that every figure is a repetition, but the figure-as-repetition is 
itself the product of the repetition which is not itself a figure, but which 
originates figuration. Having no perceptible or intelligible source, the figure of 
the woman in III Seen III Said allows the missing (originary) repetition, on the 
basis of which the repetition of the figure of the woman is possible, to 
“appear” — but in its missing: the woman is neither present nor absent. As, in 
another context, Lacoue-Labarthe says:
7 THOMAS Trezise, Into the Breach: Samuel Beckett and the Ends of Literature (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 19—20.
8 Jacques Derrida, “Differance,” in: Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982).
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The absence of that on the basis of which there is imitation, the absence of the 
imitated or the repeated [...] [in our case it is the absence of the idea, the 
absence of the consolidated object of sight] reveals what is by definition 
unrevealable — imitation or repetition. In general, nothing could appear, arise 
or be revealed, “occur,” were it not for repetition. The absence of repetition, 
by consequence, reveals only the unrevealable, gives rise only to the 
improbable, and throws off the perceived and well-known.9
That is precisely why the confusion of imaginings and things about which 
Beckett speaks is “[cjonfusion amounting to nothing” — what comes to the 
surface here is the very movement of figuration or the mimetic itself, therefore, 
what takes place is strictly speaking no-thing', the uncanny as the “phenome­
non” in all its purity.
This no-thing, although temporarily “gathered round” the vague figure of 
the woman, is nevertheless that which cannot appear as such on the scene of 
seeing. The eye that tries to see this invisible/unintelligible has to focus on the 
figure in order to make it distinct, to make it stand out from the ground, but 
what it encounters in the process is only more confusion, more haze — this is 
what is “revealed” when, rather than look at the reflected light, one looks at 
the sun: light in its might, light that effaces all figures:
She is vanishing. With the rest. The already ill seen bedimmed and ill seen 
again annulled. The mind betrays the treacherous eyes and the treacherous 
word their treacheries. Haze sole certitude. The same that reigns beyond the 
pastures. It gains them already. It will gain the zone of stones. Then the 
dwelling through all its chinks. The eye will close in vain. To see but haze. Not 
even. Be itself but haze. How can it ever be said? Quick how ever ill said 
before it submerges all. Light. In one treacherous word. Dazzling haze. Light 
in its might at last. Where no more to be seen. To be said. (88)
What cannot be seen as the object is that which allows the seeing of the object, 
that is to say, light. However, “not the light that appears (lumen) by clinging to 
surfaces, but the light that flashes (lux) and that causes to appear, itself 
nonapparent as such. Lux without fiat, having neither creator, subject, nor 
source, being the source but in itself refracted, in itself radiant, exploding, 
broken.”10 Therefore, in order to erase itself — to erase itself as the very figure 
of seeing — the eye not only has to annihilate what is seen (seeing nothing but 
haze it would still see itself seeing) but it has to become the haze, that is to say, 
9 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, ed. Christopher 
Fynsk (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 195.
10 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996), p. 33.
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annihilate itself as seeing. In this way, what cannot be figured, the mimetic, is 
made by Beckett into a relationship of figures: both figures (the woman and 
the eye) are put on the scene only to efface one another — what we are left 
with is the inexplicable state of confusion. We are given a figure, but one that 
is not a figure of knowledge. What is figured in it is something vague and 
monstrous that cannot be turned into a meaning — it does not explain any­
thing, on the contrary, it is the figure of confusion whose sole function is to bar 
the production of meaning.
The absolute evacuation of the scene is, however, only the dream of the eye 
that keeps reappearing throughout the text. To quote but one more example:
Let her vanish. And the rest. For good. And the sun. Last rays. And the 
moon. And Venus. Nothing left but black sky. White earth. Or inversely. No 
more sky or earth. Finished high and low. Nothing but black and white. 
Everywhere no matter where. But black. Void. Nothing else. Contemplate 
that. Not another word. Home at last. Gently gently. (75)
Yet, the next paragraph starts: “Panic past pass on. The hands. Seen from 
above. They rest on the pubis intertwined,” and on continues the description 
of the scene of seeing. Similarly, the end of III Seen III Said is only such a panic:
First last moment. Grant only enough remain to devour all. Moment by 
glutton moment. Sky earth the whole kit and boodle. Not another crumb of 
carrion left. Lick chops and basta. No. One moment more. One last. Grace to 
breathe that void. Know happiness. (97)
Yet, no happiness awaits. The reason for this lies in that mimesis is its own 
movement among forms/figures that are not pre-mimetic but that arise from it 
(repetition, mimesis are originary). Although the mimetic does not usually 
present itself but remains the “ground” against which figures appear, as we 
have already seen, it is possible in writing, with some ingenuity, to turn this 
ground into a figure, but it is a figure that is not an image, it is a “second 
degree” figure, a figure of the absence of figure, and therefore a figure of the 
strange(r). Yet, such figuring is possible only with the help of a figure (of the 
woman, of the scene of seeing, etc.) that is effaced in the process of turning the 
ground of this figure into a figure. Therefore, the effaced figure always remains 
within the ground turned into a figure, precisely in the position of being its ground 
— after the process of effacing wipes out all the sensible/intelligible from the 
figure, it remains as the vestige, pure difference, trace, or, to be more precise, 
the very tracing of the trace (the movement of mimesis). Thus, we can say that 
there is no ground as such or that the only “ground” for all figures lies in their 
differences — in the process of production, that is to say, repetition, a figure 
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can always become a ground for its ground and, by these means, turn its 
ground into a figure. Yet, because the figuration described here cannot be 
turned into a homogenous image, such a “ground” or trace is never one, it is 
the multiplicity of grounds and figures that has its already refracted source in 
the originary repetition — what we are used to call mimesis is, in its essence, 
a heterogenesis.11 This is precisely what the eye dreads (if it is dread), but from 
which it can never escape:
Absence supreme good and yet. Illumination then go again and on return no 
more trace. On earth’s face. Of what was never. And if by mishap some left 
then go again. For good again. So on. Till no more trace. On earth’s face. 
Instead of always the same place. Slaving away forever in the same place. At 
this and that trace. And what if the eye could not? No more tear itself away 
from the remains of trace. Of what was never. (96)
The eye cannot. No happiness to know then.
But, leaving aside for a while the matters of mimesis and figuration, there is 
also one more question that remains to be asked here: is the sex (if it is sex) of 
the apparition a matter of accident? Although the figure of the woman does 
not immediately reveal the unrevealable, that is, the monstrous, nevertheless, 
in the final analysis, it becomes the site of its support within the region of the 
visible. Is there anything feminine (which, in such a situation, would also have 
to mean inhuman) in this kind of monstration? We do not have to search very 
far to find clues. The one at hand, and famous, is aphorism 361 of The Gay 
Science:
Falseness with a good conscience; the delight in simulation exploding as 
a power that pushes aside one’s so-called “character,” flooding it and at times 
extinguishing it; the inner craving for a role and mask, for appearance; an 
excess of the capacity for all kinds of adaptations that can no longer be 
satisfied in the service of the most immediate and narrowest utility — all of 
this is perhaps not only peculiar to the actor?11 2
The creatures Nietzsche has in mind are all those who can be rumoured not to 
display or possess any stable property, all those who are perceived as the ones 
who present themselves as what they are not, the “human agents” that can 
become everyone but who are, in themselves, no one — without “character,” 
without proper “interior.” This “lack of qualities” is characteristic (in the 
aphorism) not only of the actor but also of two other paradigmatic figures of 
11 Nancy, The Muses, pp. 24—26.
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1974), p. 316.
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the western civilisation: the Jew and the woman. It is in them that pure 
mimeticism finds its impersonation — they are the perfect mimeticians whose 
dissimulating proficiencies are guaranteed by their missing content. The 
woman — and here Nietzsche is, of course, only the mouthpiece of a long 
tradition of representing the woman — does not resemble herself but always 
already masks herself, it is her very essence: she is a perpetual flight from 
herself. Although she is “somebody,” her being just an empty form of identity 
does not let her be identified or recognised. Being thus a perfect figure of 
nobody, she is the immaculately faceless image: “no one — in person,”13 
monstrous and uncanny.
13 Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography p. 119.
Sławomir Masłoń
Mgła to jedyna pewność: zamęt i figura 
w Źle widziane źle powiedziane Samuela Becketta
Streszczenie
Autor próbuje pokazać, jak poprzez skomplikowane operowanie obrazami oka, mgły, sceny 
widzenia i tego, co jest widziane, Beckett stwarza matrycę ruchu, który wytwarza figury, gdzie to, 
co nie da się przedstawić (mimetyczność jako taka), przybiera postać relacji między figurami, 
zacierającymi jedna drugą, to znaczy wytwarzającymi „zamęt”, który jednak sam nie może 
uniknąć stania się figurą. Ponieważ zatarcie takie jest możliwe tylko za pomocą jakiejś figury 
(widzianej kobiety, sceny widzenia itp.), która ulega wymazaniu lub, mówiąc inaczej, zniszczeniu 
w procesie przekształcania tła tej figury w figurę, wymazana figura zawsze pozostaje obecna w tle 
przekształconym w figurę właśnie jako jej tło — po tym jak proces wymazywania usuwa wszystko, 
co zmysłowe/rozumowe z figury, pozostaje ona jako resztka, czysta różnica, ślad, czy też, ujmując 
rzecz bardziej precyzyjnie, jako samo odciskanie się śladu (ruch mimesis). Stąd też możemy 
powiedzieć, że nie istnieje tu tło jako takie, a także to, że jedynym „tłem” wszystkich figur są 
zachodzące między nimi różnice — w procesie wytwarzania, czyli nieskończonego powtórzenia 
(czym innym jest literatura?), figura zawsze może się stać tłem swego tła, aby w ten sposób 
przekształcić owo tło w figurę.
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Der Nebel ist eine einzige Sicherheit: Chaos und Figur 
im Samuel Becketts Werk Nicht gern gesehen fatsch gesagt
Zusammenfassung
Der Verfasser versucht zu zeigen, wie Beckett die Bilder des Auges, des Nebels, der Wahr­
nehmungsbühne und dessen was gesehen ist benutzend Figuren erzeugt, wo alles was nicht 
vorstellbar ist (Mimese als solche) als eine Relation zwischen den Figuren erscheint, die gegenseitig 
verblassend ein Chaos hervorrufen, das aber nicht davonkommen kann, selbst eine Figur zu 
werden. Da solch ein Verblassen nur mittels einer Figur möglich ist (die gesehene Frau, die 
Wahrnehmungsbühne u. dgl.), die entfernt wird oder anders gesagt im Prozess des Figurwerdens 
zerstört wird, bleibt die entfernte Figur immer in dem in eine Figur verwandelten Hintergrund als 
deren Hintergrund — nachdem alles Sinnliche/Verstandesmäßige aus der Figur entfernt worden 
ist, wird diese Figur zu einem Rest, reinem Unterschied, einer Spur oder genauer gesagt zum 
Spurhinterlassen selbst (Mimesis-Bewegung). So kann man sagen, dass es hier keinen Hintergrund 
sensu stricto mehr gibt und als einziger „Hintergrund“ für alle Figuren gelten die zwischen ihnen 
auftretenden Unterschiede — im Erzeugungsprozess, also durch endloses Wiederholen (was 
anderes ist die Literatur eigentlich?), kann eine Figur immer zum Hintergrund ihres eigenen 
Hintergrunds werden, um auf diese Weise den Hintergrund in eine Figur verwandeln.
